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A Framework For Evaluating Willingness Of FRAND
Licensees
By Jorge Contreras (March 16, 2021, 4:39 PM EDT)
An increasing number of cases around the world turn on whether a
manufacturer of a product — e.g., a smartphone, a tablet or a car — is
willing to pay a fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory, or FRAND, royalty
for patents that are essential to an industry standard embodied in that
product (standard-essential patents).
This article explores the significance of willingness in the FRAND context
and offers a new legal framework for evaluating an manufacturer's, or
implementer's, willingness to accept a license on FRAND terms. In doing so,
it identifies conduct that typically indicates willingness or unwillingness, as
well as an intermediate range of conduct that should be viewed as
indeterminate — subject to classification only after additional conduct has
been observed.
It is hoped that this framework will assist courts and parties in systematically and consistently
analyzing implementer behavior when disputes over FRAND terms arise.
FRAND Licensing Commitments
The interoperability standards that enable the connectivity of most electronic products today (e.g.,
Wi-Fi, 3G/4G/5G, USB, Bluetooth, etc.) have been developed by industry participants under the
auspices of trade groups known as standards-development organizations. Because these
standards are often technologically sophisticated, they may include inventions that are patentable.
To promote adoption of standards, most SDOs require their participants to agree to disclose
and/or license their standard-essential patents to implementers on terms that are either royalty-
free (e.g., Bluetooth, USB, HDMI, XML, HTTP) or bear royalties that are FRAND (e.g., 3G/4G/5G,
Wi-Fi, MPEG).
Not surprisingly, disputes have arisen regarding the level of royalties charged by some standard-
essential patent holders, and whether those SEP holders have complied with their commitments to
offer royalties that are FRAND.
Injunctions and Willing Licensees
Because an implementer that lacks a license under relevant SEPs is technically infringing those
SEPs, issues have arisen regarding an SEP holder's ability to sue such an implementer for patent
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infringement and, in particular, to obtain an injunction preventing its manufacture and sale of a
standardized product.
While injunctions are typical remedies in patent infringement cases, the U.S. test for granting
injunctive relief under the 2006 U.S. Supreme Court decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC[1]
requires a court to determine whether the patent holder will suffer irreparable harm if an
injunction is not issued, and whether monetary damages would adequately compensate it for the
infringement.
Since SEP holders with FRAND commitments have, by definition, agreed to accept monetary
royalties for licenses of their SEPs, these factors typically weigh against the issuance of injunctions
for FRAND-encumbered SEPs.[2] 
Courts in the U.S., Europe and China, as well as the U.S. International Trade Commission, have
weighed in on the circumstances under which an SEP holder may seek injunctions against
unlicensed implementers.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit observed in its 2014 Apple Inc. v. Motorola Inc.
decision that "an injunction may be justified where an infringer unilaterally refuses a FRAND
royalty or unreasonably delays negotiations to the same effect."[3] But the court also pointed out
that "this does not mean that an alleged infringer's refusal to accept any license offer necessarily
justifies issuing an injunction. For example, the license offered may not be on FRAND terms."
Considerations such as these have been collectively referred to as the "willing licensee" test. That
is, courts will generally decline to enjoin the infringement of an SEP when, and for so long as, the
implementer is a willing licensee. What's more, an SEP holder's attempt to obtain an injunction or
other exclusionary order under such circumstances may constitute a breach of its FRAND
obligation.[4]
Indicia of Willingness
What, then, is a willing licensee? At the most basic level, it is an implementer that is prepared to
enter into an SEP license on FRAND terms. But what criteria, beyond the parties' self-serving
statements, exist to assess whether a particular implementer is willing or unwilling in this regard?
As noted above, the Federal Circuit in Apple v. Motorola offered two examples of conduct
suggesting that an implementer is not a willing licensee: (1) unilateral refusal of a FRAND royalty,
and (2) unreasonable delay of negotiations to the same effect.
The first of these examples (unilateral refusal) is straightforward only if the royalty offered by the
SEP holder is already known to be FRAND (e.g., through a prior adjudication in the relevant
jurisdiction). If not, then the implementer may legitimately dispute whether or not the royalty
demanded by the SEP holder is, indeed, FRAND. Given prominent examples in which SEP holders
have sought to charge royalties many times above adjudicated FRAND rates, such skepticism may
not be unwarranted.[5]
The second example of unwillingness — an implementer's "unreasonable delay of negotiations" is
even more difficult to assess objectively. Patent licensing negotiations can be complex and
resource-intensive, often taking months or years to conclude.
In assessing whether an implementer has unreasonably delayed negotiations, the European Court
of Justice explained in its 2015 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp. decision[6] that an
alleged infringer must "diligently respond" to an offer of a FRAND royalty "in accordance with
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recognised commercial practices in the field and in good faith, a point which must be established
on the basis of objective factors and which implies, in particular, that there are no delaying
tactics."[7]
This form of unwillingness thus depends on the implementer's conduct in response to an SEP
holder's licensing offer. Making plausible counterproposals and negotiating in good faith probably
indicate a willingness to license, whereas a refusal to engage in negotiation and deliberate
"delaying tactics" suggest otherwise. 
Jurisdictional Differences — An Implementer Duty?
Though the reason for looking into implementer willingness/unwillingness is similar in the U.S. and
EU (i.e., to determine whether an SEP holder may seek an injunction against an implementer), the
legal theories underlying this analysis differ between the two jurisdictions. 
While the analysis by U.S. courts is part of the four-part eBay test for granting injunctive relief
(i.e., whether monetary compensation will adequately remedy the SEP holder's injury), the EU
focus is on whether the SEP holder will violate European competition law (i.e., Article 102 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) by seeking such an injunction. Consequently,
the standards for determining implementer willingness may differ between these two
jurisdictions. 
The German Federal Court of Justice held last year in Sisvel International SA v. Haier Deutschland
GmbH[8] that an implementer must indicate its willingness in a "clear and unambiguous" fashion.
Both the Sisvel court and the U.K. Supreme Court's decision last year in Unwired Planet
International Ltd. v. Huawei[9] appear to imply an "obligation" to negotiate in good faith on the
part of the implementer.
However, the basis for such an obligation does not appear to exist under U.S. law, as no
affirmative duty is imposed on the implementer of a standard — it is simply at risk of infringement
if it does not obtain a required license. The contractual obligation created by the FRAND
commitment — a function of the SDO policy to which the SEP holder agreed — is solely on the
SEP holder.
Even the contractual duty to negotiate in good faith, recognized in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit's 2012 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc. decision and other U.S. cases, is a duty
imposed on the SEP holder, as the party to a contract with the SDO, not on the implementer,
which is merely an intended third-party beneficiary of that contract.[10]
A Willingness Spectrum
As discussed above, a number of objective factors, informed by relevant commercial practice,
should affect the characterization of an implementer as being willing or unwilling to enter into a
FRAND licensing agreement. These factors, and the degree to which they apply to a particular
implementer, can be arranged along a spectrum spanning implementer conduct ranging from
expressly willing (the SEP holder should not be permitted to seek an injunction) to expressly
unwilling (the SEP holder should be permitted to seek an injunction).
A number of points along this spectrum are discussed below, including an intermediate category
termed "potentially willing licensee," which itself should not permit an SEP holder to seek an
injunction, but which could shift to willing or unwilling status depending on the implementer's
subsequent actions.
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Willing Licensee (Injunction May Not Be Sought)
1. Unconditional Willingness
The implementer indicates that it will accept a license on the terms offered by the SEP holder.
2. Willingness to Negotiate
The implementer indicates that it will accept a license on FRAND terms, but believes that the SEP
holder's offer is above FRAND; the implementer makes a counteroffer that it believes to be FRAND
within a reasonable period of time.
3. Willingness to Accept Adjudicated Rate
The implementer indicates that it will accept a license on FRAND terms, but believes that the SEP
holder's offer is above FRAND; the implementer seeks a judicial determination of the applicable
FRAND rate, or indicates that it is willing to accept a rate determined by a particular court or
arbitrator.
Potentially Willing Licensee (No Injunction May Be Sought Unless Shifted to "Unwilling
Licensee" Category)
1. Willingness to Consider Adjudicated Rate
The implementer indicates that it will accept a license on FRAND terms, but believes that the SEP
holder's offer is above FRAND; the implementer indicates that it is willing to consider whether a
rate determined by a particular court or arbitrator is FRAND. Depending on the implementer's
actions following the rate determination, this condition will move to "willing licensee" or "unwilling
licensee" category, depending on the subsequent actions of the implementer.
2. Uncertainty Regarding Patent Validity
The implementer raises good faith questions regarding the validity of the asserted patents.[11] If
an adjudicator resolves this question in favor of the SEP holder, this condition will move to
the "willing licensee" or "unwilling licensee" category or the "willingness to consider adjudicated
rate" subcategory, depending on the subsequent actions of the implementer. If an adjudicator
resolves these questions in favor of the implementer, no further action is required.
3. Uncertainty Regarding Patent Essentiality
The implementer raises good faith questions regarding the essentiality of the asserted patents to
the relevant standard.[12]
If an adjudicator resolves this question in favor of the SEP holder, this condition will move to the
"willing licensee" or "unwilling licensee" category or the "willingness to consider adjudicated rate"
subcategory, depending on the subsequent actions of the implementer.
If an adjudicator resolves this question in favor of the implementer, then litigation may proceed in
the normal fashion, without a FRAND commitment binding the patent holder, and with no
additional restriction on its seeking injunctive relief (but with a potentially more difficult
infringement case for the patent holder).
Unwilling Licensee (Injunction May Be Sought)
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1. Refusal Without Counteroffer
The implementer refuses the SEP holder's licensing offer and makes no counteroffer within a
reasonable period of time.
2. Nonresponsiveness
The implementer does not respond to the SEP holder's licensing offer within a reasonable period
of time.
3. Unconditional Unwillingness
The implementer states that it is not willing to accept a license on terms that are FRAND, or on
terms that have been definitively adjudicated in the relevant jurisdiction to be FRAND.[13]
Conclusion
The three broad categories of implementer status described above — willing, potentially willing
and unwilling — and the three subcategories under each are intended to offer courts and parties a
framework for evaluating the willingness of implementers to accept licenses on FRAND terms and,
consequently, the acceptability of an SEP holder's attempts to seek injunctive relief against such
implementers.
While there are doubtless many more variants and permutations that can and will arise in this
complex area, it is hoped that this simple framework may, at least, offer a useful starting point for
analysis.
Jorge L. Contreras is a professor at the University of Utah's S.J. Quinney College of Law.
The opinions expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
organization, or Portfolio Media Inc., or any of its or their respective affiliates. This article is for
general information purposes and is not intended to be and should not be taken as legal advice.
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